ACTION, OMISSION, AND THE STRINGENCY OF DUTIES
F.M. KAMMt
In this Article I examine the way in which Michael Moore in Act
and Crime1 distinguishes between action and omission, and his
reasons for thinking that negative duties are more stringent than
positive duties. In Part I, I begin by summarizing points of his argument, including his description of views alternative to his own. I
then describe my basic points of agreement and disagreement with
Moore in Part II. Finally, in Part III I elaborate on some finer
contentious points and on positions we both share. My discussion
focuses on the first three chapters of Moore's book since these
chapters discuss issues relevant to my concerns. 2
I. MOORE ON ACTION/OMISSION AND THE STRINGENCY OF DUTIES

For Moore an act is a willed event, in particular a willed
movement. An omission is a willed nonevent, hence a nonact of a
particular sort, a nonmovement of a particular sort. In formulating
this first thesis, Moore reviews and rejects at least four other ways
of formulating the act/omission distinction: (1) a grammatical test;
(2) a moral test, that is, if it is not wrong, it is an omission; (3) the
Relativized Baseline Thesis, that is, an act is what makes the world
worse than some baseline condition, and an omission only keeps or
returns the world to this condition, where the baseline for different
agents differs; and (4) a view (developed by Leo Katz)3 that a
person's act is in question when an event would not have occurred
if she had not existed, and a person's omission is in question if an
event would have occurred even if she had not existed.'
Moore's second thesis is that negative duties require us not to
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3 See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 143 (1987).
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do acts which cause states of affairs to be worse, and positive duties
5
require us not to omit acts that cause states of affairs to be better.
One can only make the world worse by an act, for it alone can cause
harm. 6 An omission (of an act) which fails to make the world
better therefore cannot cause harm.7 Moore argues that this thesis
depends on an analysis of causation which, he says, is stronger than
the necessary condition analysis of causation, for omission of an act
(or what is done while omitting to do the act) can be a necessary
8
condition for harm even if it cannot cause the harm.
Moore's third thesis is that negative duties are more stringent
than positive duties because not making the world worse is a more
stringent duty than making it better.9
One piece of Moore's
evidence of this difference in stringency can be referred to as a
defeasibility test-it takes more to defeat the negative duty than the
positive duty. For example, he says, I may leave off saving one baby
to save two, but I may not pull away a rope saving one baby in order
to save two ("The Dying Baby Cases")."° Two lives are enough to
override saving one life, but not enough to justify killing one life."
A second piece of evidence is his intuitive sense, in cases originally
presented by James Rachels, 12 that it is worse to kill someone
maliciously than to maliciously refrain from the slight effort
necessary to save a life."5

5 See id. at 25, 29, 54-59.
6 See id. at 54-59.

See id.
8 See id. at 30-31.

9 See id. at 25, 54, 58. Moore presents an adjunctive thesis to this one, which I do
not quite understand. It concerns punishment: the liberty lost in interfering to
pdxrish omission of a positive duty is usually too great to merit the punishment, but
the liberty lost in interfering to punish performance of an act that violates a negative
duty is usually so small that punishment is merited. There are exceptions, however:
the liberty lost if abortion is illegal is too great to merit punishing the violation of a
negative duty (in killing a fetus). I do not understand the view about lesser and
greater liberties, and it seems to me that even if the fetus is a person, killing it may
well be a permissible form of terminating aid, rather than a violation of negative duty.
But I will not pursue this matter here. See generally F.M. KAMM, CREATION AND
ABORTION (1992) (considering whether or when abortion would be permissible even
if the fetus were a person).
'oSee MOORE, supra note 1, at 25.

, See id.
12See James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia,292 NEw ENG.J. MED. 78, 78-

80 (1975).
s See MOORE, supra note 1, at 58-59.
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II. WHY NEGATIVE DUTIES ARE MORE STRINGENT THAN
PosITIVE DuTIES

Basically, I agree with Moore's characterization of the act/
omission distinction: that an act is a willed movement, an omission

is a nonact of a particular sort, and that omissions do not cause
events. 4 I also agree that negative duties are more stringent than
positive duties, at least when all factors besides act/omission are
held constant (for example, where motive, intent, and effort are the
same in a case involving a duty to avoid an act and in one involving
a duty to perform an act). I believe it is even likely that negative
duties are more stringent than positive duties when a good motive
and noble intention accompany the failure to perform the negative
duty and a bad motive and ignoble intention accompany the failure
to perform the positive duty. For example, there is a more
stringent duty (1) to avoid the act of intentionally rushing to the
hospital to save five friends when one foresees that one will run
over someone en route than (2) to perform the act of saving a life
when one's only reason for not doing so is a desire, propelled by
personal gain, to have the person die.
The negative duty to avoid acting is also more stringent than the
positive duty to aid, in the sense that more effort could be required
to perform the duty and more loss could be imposed for failure to
perform. This is consistent with the fact that not performing a
positive duty exhibits a worse character and is in some sense morally
more objectionable than not performing the negative duty. This
consistency implies that a difference in stringency is an indication
of some moral difference besides moral objectionableness.
I disagree with Moore's proposed explanation of the moral
significance of the negative-positive distinction. He says that
negative duties are more stringent than the positive duties, and
argues that it is because we have a stronger duty not to make the
world worse than we have to make it better. 15 But there are cases
"4The view that omissions are not causes is also, I believe, held by Warren Quinn,

although Moore believes the contrary. See MooRE, supra note 1, at 30. Quinn did
hold the view that some omissions, which are still not causes, have the same moral
significance as acts. He grouped together under the category of positive agency acts
and omissions accompanied by an intention that an event occur which would only
occur if the omission took place. See Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The DoctrineofDoingandAllowing, 98 PHIL. REV. 287-312 (1989). I have
previously discussed Quinn's views and criticized his assimilation of these two
categories. See Kamm, Non-consequentialism,supra note 2, at 367-68.
15 See MooRE, supra note 1, at 25.
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in which a negative duty is more stringent than a comparable
positive duty, even though failing to perform the negative duty
would make the world better. For example, I must not euthanize
someone against her will even though death would be in her
interest. Philippa Foot supports this view by saying that the duty of
16
justice overrides the duty of charity.
The negative duties are, I believe, less concerned with not
making things worse than with not interfering with that to which
others are entitled, and showing respect for a certain sort of
inviolability of the person. In particular, the moral duties not to
interfere with what someone else has independently of us is more
stringent than the positive duty to provide someone with more than
she would have independently of our aid. Note that the duty not to
interfere with what the person has independently of you holds even
if what she has is retained only via the help of others. This thesiscall it the Entitlement Thesis-emphasizes that relative to a particular person, you are entitled only to what you have independently of
the other person, and she is entitled to the efforts which she could
make on your behalf.
However, even the Entitlement Thesis seems not to go deep
enough for purposes of explaining the distinction between negative
and positive duties. Within the class of aiding behaviors which we
compare with negative duties not to interfere, there are: (1) acts
that we decide we have no duty to perform, (2) acts that we decide
we have a duty to perform even without a contractual obligation,
and (3) acts that we decide we have a duty to perform due to
contractual obligations. The view of the world represented by the
Entitlement Thesis may help explain why we decide certain acts fall
into class (1): relative to some person, we are entitled to what we
have independently of that person, and therefore she cannot claim
it for use on her behalf. But the claim that negative duties are
stricter than positive duties need not be merely the claim that there
are no comparable positive duties. It may also be that the duties in
categories (2) and (3) are not as stringent, even though the presence
of a duty implies that we are not fully entitled relative to another to
what we have independently of her, and may be subject to a claim
for efforts on her behalf. Although we are not entitled to keep
from her what we have independently of her, it may be that denying

" See Philippa Foot, Euthanasia,6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85, 96-98 (1977).
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her our efforts is less bad than interfering with what she has
independently of us.
III. THE ENTITLEMENT THESIS AND TESTS FOR
STRINGENCY OF DUTIES

These are the basic points of agreement and disagreement
between Moore and myself. Now I shall proceed to embellish on
these positions and explore the finer points of the issues involved.
A. The Entitlement Thesis
The Entitlement Thesis that I have proposed as a partial account
for the distinction between negative and positive duties can help
buttress the moral significance of the Relativized Baseline View
which Moore criticizes as a way of drawing an act/omission
distinction. 7 I agree that the Relativized Baseline View is not
necessary to drawing the act/omission distinction; nonetheless, in
conjunction with the Entitlement Thesis, it can help explain (despite
Moore's denials) why terminating life support is often more like
letting die than it is like killing, even though terminating aid
involves an act. The person who has begun aid and terminates it,
like the person who refuses to begin it, deprives another only of
what she would get via aid, not something she has independently of
the person who will assist or terminate aid. But an intruder who
terminates aid that someone else has begun kills a person who is
independent of her; she deprives that person of more than she
would provide. This difference accounts for why the baseline for a
person terminating aid she is providing is the condition the person
was in before she began aid, but the baseline for the intruder is how
she finds a person when that person is already receiving aid.
Furthermore, contrary to what Moore argues, the Relativized
Baseline View need not imply that we can kill someone we have
saved whenever we want. For example, if we cease aiding at t, but
the person would have continued living until t2, then if we kill the
person between t, and t2 the person would lose time alive that we
had not provided. She would lose more than we had provided and
our relationship to her becomes that of any intruder."8
1 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
'8 Moore argues that if A interferes with B who was about to save C's life, then A
kills C. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 278 n.42. I agree. If A is already saving C's life
and B interferes to take away that defense against death, she also kills C.
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My suggestion here is that there is a nonmoral criterion for
determining when a termination of aid is a killing. That is, we do
not call the termination of aid a killing merely because we think it
violates a moral right. Essentially, removing a defense against a
potential cause of death-whether the cause is one which had
already threatened the person or is entirely new-is a killing if the
person who dies was not dependent for the defense on the person
who terminates it. If an agent terminates aid and by doing so allows
a potential cause of death actually to kill someone, and it is aid that
the agent herself was providing, then we have a letting die. This will
be true even though it is an act rather than an omission that
removes the aid. By contrast, when there is an original cause of
death, for example, the agent stabs the person she is providing with
life support, there is a killing, whether the person is dependent on
or independent of the agent who kills.
We can have a letting die even when terminating aid is morally
wrong. If an agent who has a duty to save a life starts aid and then
stops, she has committed a letting die but is wrong to do so.
Furthermore, in a letting die, the agent need not be exactly the
same person as the one who began to provide the aid. Suppose one
agent of a hospital plugs someone into a life support machine and
another agent unplugs her on hospital orders. Further, imagine
that the victim was originally threatened by kidney failure and will
now die of a new infection she picks up once unplugged. (She does
not die of the original threat from which the hospital was saving
her.) The second agent should be seen as part of the entity (the
hospital) that originally plugged the person into the machine.
Therefore, the case is a letting die. If, on the other hand, the
unplugging itself caused the person's heart to stop, the unplugging
would constitute an original cause of death. The case would then
be a killing to terminate aid. This killing, however, would have
practically the same moral weight as the letting die by actively
terminating aid. It should not be analogized to killing someone who
is not dependent on the killer for lifesaving aid.
Is an agent who has a right to terminate lifesaving aid also a
killer if she was in no way connected to the provision of aid? I
believe she is, and that we then have a case of morally permissible
killing. The agent may unplug the person and thereby allow the
eventual cause of death to intercede, but that does not mean that
she lets the person die rather than kills her.
Two further points are worth making. First, doing what is
permissible certainly does not always turn a killing into a letting die.
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Injecting the person I aid with a lethal poison, even when the victim
loses only life she would have gotten from my aid may be permissible, but it is, I believe, a clear case of killing someone to end aid.
Furthermore, even if in some cases our moral evaluation of an actas rightful or not-affects our application of the label "killing" or
"letting die," this effect need not follow everywhere. As we have
seen in cases presented above, there may still be cases in which a
morally neutral criterion for distinguishing killing from letting die
is used.
It may be helpful now to summarize. I have drawn attention to
the contrast between actions that bring about originalcauses of death
(for example, stabbings) and actions that remove defenses against
death. I have also pointed to the moral relevance of a relation of
dependence between victim and agent: a victim may be dependent
upon the agent for life support or not so dependent (that is,
independent relative to this agent). The notion of dependence is a
causal notion. The view about a killing I am proposing is that the
agent's action is either (1) the original cause of death, whether the
victim is dependent or independent of her, or (2) the removal of a
defense from someone independent of her. The view I am
proposing about letting die is that the agent's action is (1) not the
original cause of death, but may be (2) the removal of a defense
from one dependent on her. The claim is that original cause
killings of dependents, unlike original cause or removal of defense
killings of people independent relative to the agent, have practically
the same moral weight as cases of letting die.
We can also use the Entitlement Thesis to argue against Leo
Katz's suggestion that a person's action is at issue if an event would
not have occurred if the person had not lived, and an omission is at
issue if an event would have occurred anyway had the person not
lived. 9 We may, of course, object to these criteria-for they are
criteria for the action/omission restriction, and not really characterizations-on the grounds that some events are overdetermined, and
an act could cause an event that would occur even in the absence of
the act or the agent who did it. But there is another objection:
Suppose A is about to save B's life, and I happen on the scene and
refuse to aid. Because I am a trendsetter, A changes her mind and
lets B die. If I had not existed B would not have died, yet I did not
9

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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kill her or cause her death since she loses only life she would have
had via my aid, not independently of me.

B. Tests for Inequivalence of Negative and Positive Duties
The evidence that Moore presents for the thesis that negative
duties are more stringent than positive duties is not as strong as it
might be. First, while I have no objection to defeasibility tests in
general, the particular case (of dying babies) that he uses may be
problematic because cases in which we save two instead of one have
a structure of redirection of efforts which save from a lesser to a
greater number. If we want to test for the moral difference between
act and omission, we should do so in cases that are held constant
for all other factors. A case in which we kill one by pulling on her
rope to save two is not a redirection type of case. Redirection cases
involving negative duties occur when we take a threat which is
facing two people and redirect it to one, and in such cases killing is
in fact permissible. Therefore a redirection case will not show that
negative duties are harder to defeat than positive duties. Furthermore, when we save two babies instead of one we are not defeating
a positive duty to aid one; we are fulfilling the positive duty of
aiding as many as we can, so it is not clear that the aiding case
represents a defeasibility test case at all.
We can make Moore's point more clearly by arguing that the
duty to not kill may require us to drive down a very dangerous road
rather than over an easy one where we will run over someone, but
the duty to aid a dying person may be defeated if we would have to
go down a very dangerous road to rescue.
The second problem with defeasibility tests is one of insensitivity. They may pick up a difference between the moral significance of act and omission in general, but miss it in particular cases.
For example, as Moore notes, some (like Quinn)2" who think
negative duties are more stringent than positive duties per se may
think that in particular cases, negative and positive duties can be
equally wrong (even if for different reasons).2
I believe that to see how these cases differ it is useful to develop
other tests for inequivalence. Consider the following cases:
" See supra note 14.
21Moore classifies me with this group. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 58-59. On the
basis of my work that is already in print, this is not an unreasonable conclusion to
draw. In fact, I agree with Moore that even Rachels's cases differ in wrongness. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Case B1 (Killing): I push a child underwater in a tub, thereby
killing her, in order to collect her inheritance.
Case B2 (Letting die): A child slips in the bathtub. I could easily
lift her out but do not, because I want to collect her inheritance.
Let us assume that these are properly equalized cases for all factors
besides killing and letting die (for example, motive, effort, and
intention). One way to deny that they support the thesis of the
equivalence of killing and letting die is to argue that we evaluate
them as equally bad, even though killing and letting die differ per
se, because bad intention swamps differences in other factors. This
is to argue that this one case represents a specific context that hides
the true difference between killing and letting die per se. Let us
put this argument to one side and consider whether we really do
think these cases are equally objectionable. Rather than rely on our
direct intuitions about BI and B2, consider a further test. Consider
how much of a loss we would think ourselves justified in imposing
on someone, or how great an effort we could require of her, if her
suffering the loss at t2 would help save the life of the child she tried
to kill at t, in BI or failed to aid at t, in B2.
This test requires that the act not yet have succeeded in causing
death and that the omission not yet have made further aid impossible. We also assume that if the loss is not imposed at t2, the child
will die.2 2 I call this the Post-Efforts Test since what is involved is
deciding on efforts to be made (or loss imposed) after someone has
done something that is considered wrong (for example, attempting
to let die or kill).
What answer shall we give to the question posed by the PostEfforts Test? It would be right to require an agent (for example, in
B1) who tried to kill to suffer a loss to save her victim equivalent to
(or greater than) the loss she threatened to impose on her victim.

2 In response to my proposing this test, Raziel Abelson has commented in
conversation on the problem ofindividuating omissions. Would we say that someone
had done something wrong if she fails to aid at t, but does aid at t,? It is hard to tell
whether the wrong omission for which someone must make up has occurred, or
whether aid has just been put off. This difficulty can be overcome in at least two

ways: (1) assume for purposes of argument that we know that the agent's delay was
due to the intention never to aid, or (2) accept behavioral criteria for demonstrating
no intention to aid, constructing the case so that someone went away from where she
could be of assistance and must be brought back.
We could run the same test in a purely hypothetical fashion by assuming that the
child had died. We then ask how much of an effort could permissibly be demanded
of the killer and the nonsaver if only this would resurrect the child.
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I believe it would not be right to require such high post-efforts of
a person who let die (for example, in B2). So even cases like B1 and
B2 which seem equally objectionable at first do not seem to merit
equal post-efforts. One explanation for the difference in postefforts is that killing and letting die differ in some morally relevant
way. That is, if the killing and letting die in such cases are just as
morally bad, should it not be permissible to prevent the consequences of one behavior by the same means it is permissible to
prevent the consequences of the other, if the cases are properly
equalized? I believe it is permissible (if necessary) to kill the person
who pushes the baby into the water to achieve the good consequences of the baby's not drowning (even if not by preventing her
act, for example, I shoot her, she topples into the water, and the
baby pops out). But I do not think it is permissible for me to force
the person in B2, who I am certain has omitted to aid and who
would not otherwise aid, to aid the baby by shooting off her arm so
that she reaches out with the other arm. Nor may I kill her so that
she topples into the water and the baby pops out. Therefore,
perhaps even in these cases, there is a morally relevant difference
between the killing and letting die.
Philippa Foot has argued that letting die is contrary to charity
but not to justice-that is, letting die is not a matter of violating
rights.2" By contrast, killing is a matter of violating rights (at least
in cases like Bi). This could account for the difference in what we
are required to do by the Post-Efforts Test, if violating rights were
morally subject to a different level of compensatory behavior than
wrong acts that do not violate rights. Alternatively, suppose there
were a positive right to aid in B2. Post-efforts for letting die might
still be different from post-efforts for attempting to kill because
violating positive rights counts for less than violating negative ones
in equalized cases. This, in turn, would be true when killing, but
not letting die, takes from someone a life she would have had
independently of the agent.
Note again, however, that the moral difference may have
nothing to do with what makes us feel outraged at the behavior; not
all morally significant differences show up in this way. Consider
another example: We may be more horrified at what is done in B2
than at what is done when someone rushes five people to a hospital
foreseeing that she will run over one person who is in the way. Yet

2S See Foot, supra note 16, at 107-08.
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we might permissibly impose greater post-efforts on someone in the
second case than in the first if this would prevent permanent bad
consequences.

24

It is useful to consider an interesting derivative of the PostEfforts test. Suppose we know that John maliciously let Mary die,
and that Jim maliciously killed Jane (in equalized cases). Knowing
this, we then find out that Jim also maliciously let his victim die.
For example, we originally thought that Jim fainted right after
shooting Jane, but then find out we were wrong; he stood by and
did not aid for malicious reasons.
Would we increase the post-efforts required of Jim or losses we
imposed on him to make up for or prevent the consequence of what
he did, once we find out he also let die? I think not. The efforts
would be at their highest point already due to his act of killing.
Indeed, if someone had a change of heart and tried to help the
person he had endangered (that is, he did not intend to let die), I
believe he would still have to make the maximum efforts to make
things up to his victim (although we would think better of him than
of the "unrepentant" person).
But suppose we found out thatJohn, who we already knew had
maliciously let Mary die, also maliciously caused Mary's death.
Would not the post-efforts demandable of John go up? I believe
they would. If so, it would be because the efforts morally demandable were not already at their maximum. A possible explanation of
this contrast with the previous case is that negative duties are more
stringent than positive duties.
After these additions to our knowledge, the cases involvingJim
and John both present us with cases of someone who killed and let
die. Yet, I believe, the order of discovery changes our decision
about post-efforts. That is, letting die added to a known killing
brings no change in post-efforts because killing already, by itself,
calls forth maximum efforts. Killing added to a known letting die,
however, increases the post-efforts, because letting die by itself does
not call forth maximum post-efforts.

4 We might also do more to prevent the driver's act-what I call a pre-effort-than
to stop the other person from maliciously not aiding. This may be because the
negative duties are more stringent than positive duties.
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C. Equalizing with Approximate DefinitionalProperties
We have considered the use of the Post-Efforts Test for certain
equalized killing and letting die cases in order to see if we could
strengthen Moore's defense of the moral inequivalence of negative
and positive duties. We can take this discussion in a new direction
by applying the Post-Efforts Test to killing and letting die cases that
have been equalized in a different way. We can equalize cases in a
somewhat different way by exporting properties which approximate
the definitional properties of killing into letting die cases. An
example is an approximation to causation that does not turn the
letting die case into one that also has a killing in it. For example,
I tell someone to jump into the water when she would not otherwise
have done so, foreseeing that she will drown. Then I do not aid her
when she needs my help. Furthermore, we can add what is perhaps
missing in standard letting die cases, namely, a clear right of the
victim to receive aid. Such a case might involve my not aiding
someone after I prompt her to go into the water by promising I will
aid her, when I am a bodyguard specifically paid to aid. I believe
the Post-Efforts Test says that efforts demandable are greater here
than in standard letting die cases. This suggests that as cases gather
more properties like those present in standard killings, letting die
gets worse. Do they get worse than killings? I believe not.
At this point it is appropriate to introduce a transitivity
argument against the claim that standard equalized cases involve a
killing and a letting die that are morally equivalent. Suppose the
Post-Efforts Test shows that a letting die case to which we add both
an approximation to causation (or its cousin) and an explicit right
to aid becomes morally worse than a standard letting die case. It
does not, however, become worse than a standard equalized killing
case. Does this not suggest that a standard case of letting die is not
morally as bad as a standard case of killing? That is, if A is worse
than B, and A is no worse than C, is it not a good bet that C will be
worse than B?
In criticizing the Post-Efforts Test, some might claim that
unequal post-efforts are not explained by the fact that letting die
differs morally per se from killing. Rather, unequal post-efforts are
explained by the fact that in all standard letting die cases the person
who lets die necessarily has an accomplice. That is, when the
person who lets die did not also perform the act which endangers
the other person, someone or something (nature) must have caused
the danger. When there are two "sources" of a person's death, it
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might be claimed, post-efforts should be divided. Therefore, it is no
wonder that the person who only lets die has lower efforts demandable of her post-omission. When the person who let die is also the
one who killed, the post-efforts should increase. This is not because
killing and letting die differ, but only because there is now one
factor (one person) instead of two factors morally responsible for
the death. In the standard killing case, either one person both
causes death and lets die, or one person causes death and no one
else lets die. There is then no one or thing with whom to share
responsibility.
Furthermore, one might say, the person who lets die must do so
after the operation of the cause which will kill. It is not that she
does anything intrinsically different, only that she does it after, and
that makes what she does count for less.
This two-part objection can be answered. Take the last part
first: the fact that the nonaider's role comes after does not show
that it is less bad per se. If killing and letting die were morally
equivalent, then the same argument should apply to killing. That
is, if two people were jointly involved in killing (so that each one's
act is necessary but not sufficient to result in death), then the one
who sticks her dagger in last should be less morally responsible for
the death than the one who sticks her dagger in first. But this
seems incorrect. In fact, one might argue in this killing case that
the person last in line, the one who ensures the death, is morally
more responsible for it.
If the person last in line were morally more responsible, and it
was correct to treat letting die as equivalent to killing, then the
person who lets die should have greater moral responsibility for the
death than the person who caused the danger, because the person
who lets die is last. So, in a sense, if letting die were morally
equivalent to killing, it would be worse than killing.
In response, some might argue that because it comes later,
letting die did not create the need for aid. This, however, seems
like an argumentfor a moral difference between standard killing and
letting die, since endangering creates a need for aid. However, the
person who endangered someone might complain that if not for the
person who lets die, or nature's failure to "come to the rescue," her
own act would have been innocuous. The probability that an act
will cause a death could be determined by taking into consideration
whether other people will help protect a victim from the consequences of the act. If no one will help, an act is dangerous;
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otherwise it is not. The person who is needed to save would be
responsible for the probability that any act is dangerous.
So, unless letting die were morally different from killing, there
are reasons to think that the "after" factor (which is conceptually
true of letting die) would make it morally worse than doing the act
which introduces the cause of death, rather than merely equivalent
to it. On the other hand, suppose that coming after did make
conduct less bad, and coming after was conceptually true of letting
die. This would support the argument, other things being equal, for
letting die being less bad than killing per se. That is, the "after"
factor, because it is conceptually true of letting die, would help
constitute on the moral status of letting die per se. One could not
simply say that letting die and killing were morally equivalent per se,
but the "after" factor made letting die less bad. This is because the
factor that made letting die less bad would be one that was
conceptually true of it.
Now we can turn to the first part of the objection to the PostEfforts Test. This is the claim that letting die accrues lower postefforts because there is an accomplice. If killing and letting die
were morally equivalent per se, and the intuitive judgment supporting a difference in post-efforts held, then what is said of letting die
should also be true of killing. Suppose that two killers are jointly
responsible for a death, but only one is available to make efforts to
prevent the ultimate bad consequences for the victim. Thus the
effort demandable of the one should be, at most, one half of what
could be demanded of the two together. In addition, suppose we
found out that someone had let die the victim of a known killer
(who had fainted after her act). Since the killer had a letting die
accomplice, the killer's post-effort requirement should go down.
Indeed, as noted above, it might be said that killers also have
unhelpful nature as a later accomplice, just as those who let
someone die from natural causes.
Both these results seem incorrect. The efforts may be shared if
two killers are available. But each one is morally responsible for the
death, and this gives her responsibility for making the maximum
post-effort demandable if the other killer is not present with whom
to share it.25 So if killing and letting die were morally equivalent,
25 However, suppose there were an agreement for me to endanger and for another
person to rescue rather than to let die, and I would not have endangered without
believing the other would rescue. If the other does not rescue, required post-efforts
should decrease for me since the nonaider failed in what is here agreed to be her
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in the absence of a person who was an "accomplice," the person
who lets die should also have to make the maximum effort demandable.
D. Justice, Charity, and Stringency

Let us return to cases B1 and B2 and the question, which Moore
discusses, of whether or not they are equally objectionable. Philippa
Foot claims that not aiding is not necessarily less objectionable than
killing. For example, in cases B1 and B2, she says "[i]t is not that
[the] killing is worse than [the] allowing to die."2 6 However,
according to Foot, when not aiding in this case is wrong, it is
contrary to the virtue of charity, whereas when killing is wrong it is
contrary to the virtue of justice.27 That is, one has a right not to
be killed, but no right to be aided in this case, since justice is a
matter of rights. When we refuse to give our medicine to someone
in whose interest it is to die but who does not want to die, we act
for the sake of charity and we violate no right to aid. When we kill
someone in whose interest it is to die but who does not want to die,
we also act for the sake of charity, but we violate a right not to be
killed against one's wishes ("The Euthanasia Cases"). Presumably,
Foot thinks that not violating this right takes precedence over acting
charitably, and therefore it is wrong to kill in this case. Notice that
if one respects rights and does not kill, one need not aim against
the best interests of a person. That is, one is not aiming to be
uncharitable if one does not kill. One only foresees that one will
not be able to promote her interests because rights stand in the way.
A problem with Foot's account is that there are cases in which
it is permissible to interfere with negative rights (not to be interfered with) for the sake of doing a charitable act. For example, we
stop suicides when we believe death is not in the person's interest.
Charitable motivation which is in favor of life, at least sometimes,
seems to override a negative right. Yet charitable motivation which
leads us to be against life does not override the negative right. This
is explicable if we say that killing someone takes away something
significant that she has independently of us (her life), and not doing
this takes precedence over charity. But interfering with a suicide
duty to aid. This assumes that my reliance on her was permitted.
26 Foot, supra note 16, at 101 (emphasis omitted).
2 See id. at 96-97.
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only takes away liberty temporarily, and the achievement of
significant benefit for the person can override this interference.
There is a second possible problem with Foot's analysis. If the
root difference between killing and letting die rests on the existence
of a right, it would be just as wrong for someone to refuse to give
lifesaving aid she had contracted to give as to kill a person. But it
could be argued that even if the person dies as a consequence,
being denied aid to which she has a right is not to suffer as great (or
perhaps a significantly different) wrong as being deprived of life she
could have had independently of an attack. When such aid is
denied, our links to other people are injeopardy. (Consequentially,
of course, we die.) When deprivation occurs, our independence
from others is in jeopardy. The latter may be more important (or
at least the sort of offense we have a right to more protection
against), because the boundaries of our independence are more
crucial to the idea of a separate person. We must (logically) first
think of separate entities before we can think of them as linked.
When having been promised aid is what prompts us to put ourselves
in jeopardy, the failure to aid comes closer to being as great a
wrong as killing. This is because someone else comes close to
having caused us to lose what we would have had independently of
her.
A third problem is whether Foot's account of the euthanasia
cases is consistent with her view that killing is not worse than letting
die in B1 and B2. If not violating a right takes precedence over
acting charitably in euthanasia, why is not violating a right in B1 a
more serious offense than simply being uncharitable in B2? That is,
if it is more important to respect the right than to render charity
when there is a conflict between the two, why is not violating the
right a more serious offense than offending charity when they
appear in separate cases like B1 and B2?
One possible answer to the last query, an answer we have
already considered, is that we may have a more stringent duty not
to kill than to save life, but this only means that one behavior is
more easily defeated than the other. For example, if this were so,
the need to make efforts would defeat the duty to aid more easily
than the duty not to kill. If the duty not to kill some particular
person is more stringent than the duty to aid some particular
person in the sense that it is less defeasible, this, it may be claimed,
does not imply that a violation of one duty when it is present is
more grave than a violation of another. There may be more
occasions in which the duty to aid is permissibly defeated. In
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particular, the duty to aid may be defeated by the duty to not kill.
That does not mean, however, that when we let die impermissibly
we have done anything less serious than when we kill impermissibly.
The Post-Efforts Test was intended to suggest that this view is
not correct. When the less stringent (under the defeasibility
standard) duty is violated, it is still a less serious matter than when
the more serious duty is violated, and therefore B1 is morally
different from B2.
Another response to our objection to Foot's account is that
independently we could judge two behaviors as morally equal, given
that there was no excuse of having to do one in order to avoid
doing the other. (An example is murder and torture; we could
judge them as equally wrong.) Yet if they are in conflict, one (for
example, murder) is preferable to the other (for example, torture).
So violating a right and having an uncharitable intention could be
as seriously wrong when judged independently, but given a choice
we should not violate a right. The problem with this response is
that while murder and torture independently may elicit equally as
great pre- and post-efforts, this does not mean that independently
they are equally morally objectionable. Indeed, preferring to do
one rather than the other suggests they are not equal. The less bad
act may just be so bad that it elicits the highest efforts we are
(morally) able to impose.
Another possible explanation of why we may hold that violating
justice is equivalent to offending charity in B1 and B2, yet deny that
we may violate justice for the sake of charity, focuses on the fact
that in B1 and B2 we contrast violating a right with intending that
something bad happen to someone. By contrast, in euthanasia cases
if we do not kill, we will not be intending that something bad
happen to someone. We only willforeseeably not promote someone's
own good. We do not aim at what is bad for her. So if killing is
worse than this foreseen failure to promote someone's welfare, this
need not mean that it is worse than intending someone harm.
What of cases in which someone respects a right because she
aims at the person's harm? For example, someone might be glad
there is a strong antipaternalistic theory of negative rights because
she knows that most people, left to their own devices, will do harm
to themselves. If they harm themselves, 'this reduces the number of
people who can successfully compete with her. We still cannot
permit violations of someone's significant negative right merely to
prevent her being the victim of an agent's aiming against her good.

1510

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 142:1493

Protecting the negative right takes precedence over preventing
action on a bad intention.
Foot herself may have come to think that her view that B2 is as
bad or in other respects morally as significant as B1 was inconsistent
with the position that rights dominate charity.28 This is because
she suggests that B2 may seem as bad as B1 because it is assumed
that there is a strict right to minimal aid in B2.2 9 This position,
however, raises problems for letting die in euthanasia cases. If
someone has a positive right from even a stranger (that is, independent of contract) to a small amount of lifesaving aid, why should we
be able to refuse it for a charitable motive?
Perhaps someone has a right to lifesaving aid only when it is in
her interest to get it, as in B2. Then we would not have to aid
rather than perform passive euthanasia (where there is no contract
for aid), though we would have to aid in B2 on grounds of a right.
However, if killing and letting die were morally equivalent, it should
then also be true that someone has a right not to be killed only
when it is in her interest not to be killed. This means it would be
permissible to kill someone against her will in euthanasia, contrary
to what Foot claims.
Foot, however, need not be worried by this since she is not
arguing for the moral equivalence of killing and letting die. She
could claim that there is a right to aid only when it is in someone's
interest but none when it is against someone's interest, unless there
is a contractual obligation to give aid (such as an explicit agreement
for aid "no matter what"). Foot can still claim that there is a serious
right not to be killed, even when being killed is in one's interests,
unless one has waived (or forfeited) the right. Notice that the
addition of a contract could strengthen a right to aid, so that we
would have to give aid even when it is against someone's interests.
By contrast, there is no need for such a special contract in the case
of the right not to be killed. This should worry a proponent of the
equivalence of killing and letting die, but not Foot. Again, note that
the reliance on a positive right in B2 to account for the supposed
equivalence of B1 and B2 is stymied if violating a positive right,
even of the clearest sort, for example, contractual, is morally not
equivalent to violating a negative right.
" See Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, in

ABORTION:

MORAL AND LEGAL

PERSPECTIVES 176, 182 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessy eds., 1984).

2 See id.
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The independence in fact of a person (which gives rise to
negative rights) seems to have a force not totally dependent on the
complete moral independence of persons (that is, where no positive
rights relate them). For example, suppose a bodyguard has a duty
to aid a drowning employer at effort X and fails to do so. Her
reason is that effort X is too great. Is this as bad as someone's
failure to make effort X to avoid an act that she foresees will drown
a stranger? The claim here is that it is not as bad.
The suggestion is that the strength of the right which protects
the life a person has independently of another is even greater than
the strength of a person's strict right to get lifesaving aid from
another. Above it was suggested that this is because negative rights
play a more fundamental role than positive rights in constituting the
idea of the person itself, given that the person is conceived as a
separate unit, however capable it is of relating to others or however
much its development into a separate unit depends on relationships. 0
Separateness and independence are not the same (as I use the
terms). A person is still a separate person even though she is
dependent for lifesaving aid on someone else. Identifying the
failure to recognize separateness with what is known as a "boundary
crossing"3 1 also does not capture the distinction in which we are
interested. If someone who is already receiving lifesaving aid is
killed by (or at the directive of) the person aiding her, there is a
boundary crossing, a move into a separate person. Yet it has been
argued that a great deal, though not all, of the negative moral
significance of this crossing is eliminated if the aid need not be
given, is sufficiently large, and if, in being killed, the person loses
only what she would get from the aid. Alternatively, even if there
is negative moral value, it is not much greater than inappropriately
" Suppose negative rights play a more fundamental role in constituting the idea
of the person itself. Then requiring those who are better off to aid the worse off,
when the worse off are not required to aid, will give them more positive duties and
may also thereby leave the better off with fewer protected negative rights than the
worse off. This may be contingent on the positive duties being enforceable by
coercive means. If they were enforceable in this way, the better off would have a
weaker sense of themselves as separate persons. Those who benefit from positive
rights do not thereby lose the sense of themselves as separate units merely because
additions are made to their welfare. Taking away (even permissibly) destroys the unit
in a way that giving to it does not, presumably because one can refuse what is given
to one, but one cannot as legitimately fail a duty to give or resist permissible
enforcement of it.
31See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 57-59 (1974).
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not aiding initially. Suppose the bodyguard in our previous cases
was already providing her employer with lifesaving aid she owes her.
This is aid that prevents the employer from falling back into the
water. The guard's doing something that causes the employer to fall
back into the water and drown has close to the same moral
significance as her initial failure to aid the employer, rather than
close to the same significance as killing her when she survives
independently of the guard.
The idea of the person who is separate relative to another that
is crucial for the negative right not to be killed is the idea of the
person who is independent of life support relative to that other
person. It is not merely the person surrounded by an identifiable
physical boundary. It may be that causing the death of a different
person (that is, where there is an identifiable physical boundary) has
its own moral weight, but it is not the great weight attached to the
transgression of a negative right. Of course, relative to those who
do not provide the life support, the person receiving life support
retains her negative rights.
CONCLUSION

I have tried to argue for the view that Michael Moore supports,
namely that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties.
I have done this by applying a Post-Efforts Test, rather than a
defeasibility test, to cases BI and B2. I have also considered
Philippa Foot's proposals on killing and letting die and argued that,
contrary to what she claims, they are inconsistent with the view that
BI and B2 have equal moral status. I have tried to account for the
difference between killing and letting die even in these cases, by
emphasizing the importance of someone's taking away what another
person has independently of her, and contrasted this with the
importance of meeting the positive rights to aid that others have.

